With the wide deployment of new computing paradigms, such as cloud computing and edge computing, the people can access services provided by remote servers more conveniently via the Internet. To preserve the security of those messages transmitted over the public channel, remote user authentication protocols are popularly implemented in various information systems. Recently, Park et al. pointed that Cao and Ge's three-factor authentication scheme suffers from offline identity guessing attack and server impersonation attack. They also proposed a new scheme after presenting the corresponding cryptanalysis. However, we found that Park et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack, which is the most serious threat against this kind of authentication scheme. In addition, their scheme cannot provide complete correctness due to the misuse of bio-hashing and also fails to achieve user untraceability and perfect forward secrecy. To conquer these security pitfalls, we put forward a password, smart card, and biometrics-based three-factor remote user authentication scheme using the extended Chebyshev chaotic maps. The security analysis indicates that the proposed scheme can withstand various well-known attacks including offline guessing attack, impersonation attack, and so on. The performance evaluation shows that the proposed scheme provides stronger security guarantee at the cost of acceptable computation overhead. Thus, the proposed scheme is more desirable for securing communication in mobile networks.
Introduction
The emergence of new computing paradigms (e.g. cloud computing and edge computing) brings great convenience for the daily life of human being, such as cloudassisted e-healthcare that employs sensors to collect health information. This enables users to remotely access these services and transmit data at anytime and anywhere through wireless sensor networks connected to the Internet. To ensure services are legally accessed and users' private information transmitted over the public channel are well protected, remote user authentication protocols [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] are essential for these information systems.
Informally, with the help of a remote user authentication scheme, a user (or a sensor node) and the remote server can check the validity of each other. That is, the 1 user can be sure that the server is the intended server rather than a malicious one, and the remote server can ensure that the user is a registered legal user. In addition, after they authenticate each other, a shared session key can be established to secure subsequent communications between them. Early remote user authentication protocols 6, 7 only use human-rememberable passwords and thus are inherently vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and insider attack.
To further strengthen the security of remote authentication scheme, smart card-based password authentication scheme 8, 9 was introduced. In the setting of this kind of authentication scheme, a user holds a password and a smart card containing related secret values. Only those users, who provide correct password and the corresponding smart card simultaneously, can pass through the authentication of the remote server. Meanwhile, the remote server no longer needs to maintain a verification table. Since the introduction of password and smart card-based two-factor authentication scheme, toward to different application environments, many related schemes [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] have been presented. On the other hand, due to the uniqueness of biometrics (e.g. fingerprint and irides), biometrics are recently introduced into the design of smart card and passwordbased authentication scheme, as the third authentication factor. Such a scheme is named as three-factor remote user authentication scheme. Naturally, biometric-based three-factor authentication scheme is more secure than previous authentication schemes.
In 2010, Li and Hwang 17 used hash function to construct a three-factor authentication scheme with low computation overhead. But Das 18 found that LiHwang's scheme suffers from various attacks and presented an improved scheme. However, An 19 pointed out that Das' scheme also cannot withstand impersonation attack and server spoofing attack. Although An 19 put forward a new three-factor authentication scheme, Khan and Kumari 20 demonstrated that this scheme cannot resist offline guessing attack, Cao and Ge 21 showed that this scheme is vulnerable to replay attack. Subsequently, Yeh et al. 22 and Wu et al. 23 further analyzed the security of these schemes.
Recently, Park et al. 24 pointed out that Cao and Ge's 21 authentication scheme suffers from off-line identity guessing attack and server masquerading attack. Then, a new three-factor authentication scheme with user untraceability was put forward after criticizing. Unfortunately, we found that Park et al.'s 24 scheme is vulnerable to offline password/identity guessing attack and in fact fails to achieve untraceability and perfect forward secrecy. In addition, their authentication scheme has serious shortage in terms of correctness and usability owning to the misuse of bio-hashing. To overcome these security pitfalls in Park et al.'s scheme, we propose a security-enhanced three-factor remote user authentication scheme based on the extended Chebyshev chaotic maps. We show that the proposed scheme can withstand various well-known attacks including offline password guessing attack, impersonation attack, replay attack, and so on. In addition, the proposed scheme also enjoys several desirable security properties, such as mutual authentication, key agreement, and perfect forward secrecy. The performance discussion indicates that the proposed scheme provides stronger security guarantees, at the cost of accepted computation overhead. Thus, it is more desirable for securing communications in mobile networks.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the preliminaries used in the proposed scheme.
Notations
Assume that U i is a user, and S is the remote sever. Table 1 summarizes the notation used throughout this article.
Chebyshev chaotic maps
The chaotic map has been widely used in the literature of cryptography, for example, chaotic map-based encryption, 25 digital signature, 26 and authentication protocols. 27, 28 Specifically speaking, the Chebyshev polynomial T x (u) is a polynomial with degree x and is defined as 29 T x (u) = cos (x Á u), where u = cos u Moreover, the recurrence relation of T x (u) is defined as Table 1 . The notations used throughout this article.
Notation Description

S
The remote server a, b
The master secret key of S U i
The ith system user ID i
The user U i 's identity PW i
The user U i 's password
The biometric template of the user
Secure one-way hash function
Bio-hashing function È
The exclusive or operation jj
The concatenation operation x, y Random integers picked by U i and S SK i, s , SK s, i Secret valued computed by U i and S T i, 1 , T s, 1 The timestamps on sides of U i and S
DT
The maximum delay allowed
for any integer x ø 2, with T 0 (u) = 1 and T 1 (u) = u. The Chebyshev polynomial also features of the semigroup property and satisfies
for any positive integers x and y and large prime p.
The security of the proposed three-factor authentication scheme is built upon the intractability of the chaotic map-based discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and the chaotic map-based computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP), which are defined as follows Property 1 (Chaotic map-based DLP). Given u, r, and p, it is hard to find an integer x satisfying T x (u) = r mod p.
Property 2 (Chaotic map-based CDHLP). Given T x (u), T y (u), T (Á), u, and p, where x, y ø 2, u 2 ( À ', + '), and p is a large prime, it is hard to compute
Bio-hashing
Jin et al. 30 combined fingerprint and pseudo-random number to achieve two-factor authentication. Specifically speaking, a user's fingerprint image B i is first transformed to a vector, which is further used to perform inner product with a set of pseudo-random number. Then, depending on a given threshold value, each inner product is mapped to 0 or 1. This results in a binary string b i , that is, H(B i ) = b i , where H(Á) is the concrete bio-hashing algorithm. Lumini and Nanni 31 further put forward improved bio-hashing. Now, biohashing has been widely used in the design of human authentication schemes. [32] [33] [34] From a perspective of practicability, fingerprints imprinted from the same person are different from each other, thus the resulted bio-hashing values are also slightly different. But given a matching algorithm M bio ( Á , Á ) and two fingerprints B i , B 0 i from the same user, the matching result M bio (H(B i ), H(B 0 i )) is smaller than a given threshold value t with overwhelming probability.
Review of Park et al.'s scheme
In this section, we briefly review Park et al.'s 24 authentication scheme, which comprises four phases, namely, system user registration phase, login phase, authentication phase, and password change phase, which are performed as follows.
Registration phase
Each system user U i needs to register with the remote server S for legally accessing the provided service. To this end, the user U i and the server S execute the following procedure.
1. The user U i freely chooses a personal password PW i and an identity ID i , and also imprints his or her biometrics B i via a sensor. Moreover, U i chooses a random number K and calculates
Then, the user U i sends the registration request message RM i = fID i , RPW i , RB i g to the server S through a secure channel. 2. Upon receiving the registration request message RM i , the server S picks a unique random number l i for U i , and further successively computes
Then, the server S writes fVID i , h(Á), H(Á), f i , e i , Z i , G i g into a new smart card, which is later issued to the user U i in a secure way. In addition, the server S stores the tuple (ID i , VID i ) into the registration table.
3. After receiving the smart card issued by the server S, the user U i rewrites the random number K into the smart card.
Login phase
A user U i logins into the remote server S by conducting the following steps:
1. The user U i inserts the smart card into a card reader, and imprints his or her biometric information B 0 i . Then, the smart card computes h(H(B 0 i ) È K) and checks that if it is equal to f i . If not, the smart card terminates the login process. Otherwise, the smart card goes to the next step. 2. The user U i inputs the corresponding password PW i and the identity ID i . Then, the smart card chooses a random number x i and computes
where T i, 1 is the current timestamp.
3. Finally, the smart card sends the login request message LM i = fDID i , Z i , m 2 , m 3 , T i, 1 g to the server S via a public channel.
Authentication phase
After finishing the login process, the user U i and the server S need to further run the authentication procedure for verifying the validity of each other and establishing a shared session key. As indicated in Figure 1 , the details of this procedure are specified as follows:
1. Upon receiving the login request message LM i from the user U i , the server S checks that if T s, 1 À T i, 1 ł DT , where T s, 1 is the current timestamp. If not, S terminates the authentication procedure. Otherwise, S further computes
and checks if VID i 0 is equal to some VID i stored in the registration table in the form of (VID i , ID i ). If not, the server S rejects the session. Otherwise, the serve S goes to the next step. 
The server S computes
m 0 1 = h(ID i jja), x 0 i = m 2 È m
Password change phase
In this phase, a user U i is allowed to freely update the original password by conducting the following steps:
1. The user U i inserts the smart card into a card reader and then inputs the original password PW i , a new password PW new i
as well as the identity ID i . In addition, the user U i imprints his or her biometrics B i 0 via a sensor.
The smart card recomputes f
If not, the smart card stops the update procedure. Otherwise, it computes r 
Cryptanalysis of Park et al.'s scheme
In this section, we first demonstrate that Park et al.'s 24 scheme cannot be implemented in practical applications due to the incorrect usage of user biometrics. Moreover, we point out that this scheme even suffers from offline password/identity guessing attack and impersonation attack and therefore fails to provide the claimed security properties. In addition, Park et al.'s scheme cannot preserve user anonymity and provide perfect forward secrecy.
Before giving the details of the above-mentioned attacks, we capture the capacity of an adversary A by the following attack model, which is widely accepted and adopted in the literature of multi-factor authentication scheme. Specifically, in this attack model, the adversary A is allowed to perform the following operations:
1. The adversary A completely controls the communication channels between any user and the remote server. This implies that A can eavesdrop any message transmitted over these public channels. Moreover, it can intercept, modify, replay, and insert any message in these public channels. 2. The adversary A can get any user's either password or smart card, but not the both. In addition, after obtaining the smart card, the adversary A can extract those secret values stored in the smart card using some particular technologies. 35, 36 3. An insider user or server might be malicious. That is, the adversary A can collude with such a malicious one.
Correctness and usability of Park et al.'s scheme
We note that in the login phase of Park et al.'s scheme, the user U i is required to imprint his or her biometrics B 0 i via a sensor. Then, the smart computes
, where B i is U i 's biometrics imprinted in the registration phase. If not, the smart card will stop the login procedure. Now we recall that h(Á) is assumed to be a one-way secure hash function. This implies that it is sensitive of its inputs. In other words, if f 
Offline guessing attack
To launch offline password guessing attack against an insider registered user U i , the adversary A needs to record these messages LM i , AM s , AS i , AM 0 s transmitted in an instance of the login and authentication procedure executed between U i and the remote server S. Then, the adversary A obtains the user U i 's smart card, from which the adversary A can further extract fVID i , h(Á), H(Á), f i , e i , Z i , G i , Kg using particular technologies. 35, 36 After that, the adversary A performs the attack by conducting the following steps:
Step 1. Establish the candidate password set P i according to the user U i 's personal information.
Step 2. Select a candidate password PW Ã i from the set P i and successively compute r In fact, the adversary A can also utilize those publicly transmitted messages to launch the offline password guessing attack. Specifically speaking, the adversary A first computes
Ã and m Denote by T h the running time of one hash operation and T x the running time of one XOR operation. Then, we can see that the computation cost of one loop of the above attack is roughly O(3T x + 3T h ), and the complexity of completing the offline password guessing attack is O(3jP i j(T x + 3T h )), where jP i j is the size of the candidate set P i . This implies that the adversary A can correctly recover U i 's password in polynomial time, which may be only several minutes on a PC.
After recovering the correct password PW i , the adversary A can further extract the user U i 's real identity by launching offline identity guessing attack.
Specifically, A first selects a candidate identity ID Ã i from the candidate identity set I i and computes
Ã jjT i, 1 ). As a result, the adversary A can verify the validity of ID Ã i by checking if DID Ã i = DID i . Similarly, the adversary A can get the user U i 's identity ID i in minutes on a PC. In practice, the establishment of the candidate password set is related to personal information and depends on social engineering.
Other security pitfalls
First, with the recovered password PW i and the identity ID i as well as the knowledge of the smart card, the adversary A can naturally impersonate the U i just by running the original scheme regularly. Second, although a user U i uses a different dynamic identity DID i in each authentication instance, the value Z i is the same in all instances. Thus, the scheme in fact fails to provide untraceability. In addition, the server S is required to maintain a registration table for verifying the identity validity of system users, which would make the scheme vulnerable to insider attack. Third, we note that the generated session key is derived from the random numbers contributed by the protocol participants with the hash function h(Á). Thus, the scheme cannot provide perfect forward secrecy. That is, once either the user's secret values or the master secret key of the server S get exposed, those previously shared session keys would be recovered, which will result in the disclosure of the private information transmitted over those secure channels based on these session keys.
The proposed three-factor authentication scheme
In this section, we propose a new three-factor authentication scheme to overcome the above-mentioned security pitfalls in Park et al.'s 24 scheme. Informally, we utilize chaotic map-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange to achieve perfect forward secrecy and mutual authentication. In addition, the smart card no longer locally checks the validity of the user password, which prevents the proposed scheme from being vulnerable to offline password guessing attack. The collision-resistant hash function and timestamp are used to guarantee the freshness of transmitted messages. Particularly, we do not consider user anonymity. In fact, this can be achieved by extending our scheme with a symmetric cryptosystem, as illustrated in existing schemes. 14, 37, 38 Specifically, the proposed scheme consists of four phases, that is, initialization, registration, login and authentication, and password change. The details of these phases are as follows.
Initialization phase
Initially, the remote server S picks a large prime p and defines Chebyshev polynomial T(Á). In addition, it chooses a random number u to compute the polynomial T (u), and let the master secret key be a. Moreover, the remote server S selects a cryptographically secure hash function h(Á), and a bio-hashing function H(Á) associated with a matching algorithm M bio ( Á , Á ).
Registration phase
In this phase, as indicated in Figure 2 , each system user U i needs to register with the remote server S by conducting the following steps:
1. The user U i selects an identity ID i and a password PW i that are both easy to remember, and imprints biometrics B i via a sensor. Then, U i picks a random number N i , and computes
. Moreover, the user U i sends the registration information RM i = fRP i , RB i , ID i g to the remote server S via a secure channel. 2. Upon receiving the registration requirement from U i , the remote server S checks U i 's validity, and then computes
The server S further writes fW i , Z i , h(Á), H(Á), T(u), ID s g into a new smart card and issues it to U i in a secure way. 3. After obtaining the smart card, the user U i rewrites the random number N i into it. This completes the registration procedure.
Login and authentication phase
If a registered user U i wants to access the service provided by the server S, then they have to interactively perform the login and authentication process to check Figure 2 . User registration phase of the proposed scheme.
the validity of each other. Meanwhile, a shared session key would be established to secure subsequent communications between them. More precisely, as illustrated in Figure 3 , this process is specified as follows:
1. The user U i attaches his or her smart card to a card reader and inputs the password PW i and identity ID i . At the same time, U i imprints his or her biometrics B 0 i via a sensor. 2. The smart card successively recomputes
Then, the smart card performs the matching algorithm M bio (H(B i ), H(B i 0 )) and checks if the result is beyond the given threshold value t. If yes, the smart card stops this session. Otherwise, it goes to the next step. If not, the smart card also stops the session. Otherwise, the remote sever S is authenticated by the user U i . The smart card further computes M i, 2 = h(X i jjY s jjK i, s jjT i, 2 ) and sends the authentication message AM i = fM i, 2 , T i, 2 g to the sever S. 6. Upon receiving the authentication message from U i , the server directly checks if h(X 00 i jjY s jjK s, i jjT i, 2 ) = M i, 2 and jT i, 2 À T s, 2 j ł DT , where T s, 2 is the current timestamp. If yes, then the user U i is authenticated by the remote server. Finally, both U i and S computes a shared session key SK = h(ID i jjID s jjX i jjY s jjK i, s ). This completes the procedure of login and authentication.
Password change phase
In this phase, a system user U i is allowed to update his or her original password in an online way. That is, the user U i first passes through the authentication of the remote server S and then conducts the following steps to update the password: ), 
Formal proof
In this section, we formally prove the security of the improved protocol in the random oracle model. We first specify the security model and then provide proof details.
Security analysis
In this section, we demonstrate that the proposed three-factor authentication scheme can withstand various attacks, including offline password guessing attack, impersonation attack, known-key attack, and so on. We also illustrate that the proposed authentication scheme captures several desirable security properties, such as mutual authentication and perfect forward secrecy. Although the formal security proof is more desirable, it is still difficult to formalize the scheme within well-studied security models. [39] [40] [41] This is mainly because that the computation capacity of the smart card is limited, and we employ different design principles to decrease the computation overhead. In fact, if there are no such restrictions, we can directly employ those authentications proved to be secure in CK model. On the other hand, we also note the security of some protocols 24, 28, [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] are discussed with the BAN logic or AVISPA. However, the BAN logic and AVISPA also cannot guarantee the security of the protocol. For example, although Park et al.'s 24 protocol is proved to be secure with the BAN logic, we show that it still has security flaws. To this end, we utilize an informal and heuristic manner to discuss the security of the proposed authentication scheme. Such a manner is widely accepted and used in the literature of multi-factor authentication scheme.
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Offline password guessing attack
If an adversary A wants to launch the offline password guessing attack against the proposed scheme, then it has to obtain a related value to verify the validity of a candidate password. Now we show that the adversary A cannot get such a value, even it holds those secret values stored in the smart card.
First, in the login message LM i = fM i, 1 , X 0 i , ID i , T i, 1 g, the value M i, 1 is the output of the hash function h(Á) on input of ID i , ID s , X 0 i , and T i, 1 , which are all transmitted on the public channel. Thus, M i, 1 cannot be used to verify the correctness of a candidate password. On the other hand, we note that the value X 0 i is derived from the user's password PW i , namely, (ID i jjPW i jjN i ) . When the adversary A corrupts the user's smart card, it can get the values W i , Z i , N i . However, if A wants to utilize X 0 i to check the validity of a candidate password PW Ã i , it has to know the value X i = T u (x), which is not directly transmitted over the channel. Moreover, to get the value X i , the adversary has to obtain the master secret key a of the server and recover it as (ID u jja) . But when the master secret key a is disclosed, the attack is trivial.
Second
of X i , the adversary A cannot employ it to verify the validity of a candidate password since the value K s, i = T y (X i ) = T y (T x (u)) is unknown to it. In fact, if A can compute K s, i , then it breaks the chaotic map-based Diffie-Hellman assumption. Similarly, the adversary A also cannot use the message AM i to check the validity of a candidate password. Therefore, the proposed scheme can be free from the offline password guessing attack.
Impersonation attack
If an adversary A wants to impersonate a registered system user U i , then it needs to generate a correct login message and response message that can pass through the verification of the remote server S. However, without the knowledge of the password PW i , the adversary A cannot compute a secret value K i, s equal to K s, i that is computed by the remote server S, since the computation of K s, i involves h(ID i jja) and the adversary A cannot compute it correctly. Thus, the adversary A fails to impersonate a registered user, and the proposed scheme can withstand user impersonation attack.
On the other hand, if the adversary A tries to impersonate the remote server S, then it has to generate correct response message AM s . From the protocol flow, we can see that the adversary A has to correctly recover X i with the value h(ID i jja), otherwise it cannot pass through the verification of the user U i . However, without the knowledge of the master key a or the user U i 's password, it is intractable for A to correctly compute h(ID i jja). Thus, the adversary cannot impersonate the remote server, and the proposed scheme can withstand server impersonation attack.
Replay attack
In the attack model, an adversary A is allowed to eavesdrop any messages transmitted over the public channel. To prevent the adversary A from launching a replay attack by resetting these messages LM i , LM s , and LM i , the proposed scheme uses random nonces and timestamps to ensure the freshness of these messages.
Specifically speaking, if the adversary A directly replays the message LM i , then it fails to pass through the verification of the server S since the timestamp T i, 1 would be obsolete. Alternatively, if the adversary A chooses to replay a modified message LM i 0 by employing the current timestamp, then it has to produce a new message M i, 1 . However, as explained above, without the knowledge of the password PW i , the adversary A subsequently cannot produce a correct response message AM 0 i and thus cannot pass through the verification of the remote server S. Consequently, the proposed scheme is secure against replay attack.
Insider attack
In the context of insider attack, a malicious service provider tries to obtain registered users' private information, such as password. In the registration phase of the proposed scheme, a user sends the message RM i = fRP i , RB i , ID i g to the server S, where
We can see that the remote server S cannot get any information about the user U i 's password PW i and biometrics B i without the knowledge of the random number N i . In addition, the remote server S also does not hold and store any information about registered users' password. Thus, the proposed scheme can resist insider attack.
Known-key attack
In the setting of known-key attack, an adversary A can obtain the information of other session keys from a corrupted session key. In the proposed authentication scheme, a session key is computed as SK = h(ID i jjID s jjX i jjY s jjK i, s ), which is derived from fresh values X i , Y s , and K i, s = T x (T y (u)), where x and y are random numbers. Hence, all session keys are independent of each other. This implies that the revelation of a session key does not influence the security of other session keys, and the proposed authentication scheme can be free from known-key attack.
Mutual authentication and key agreement
Mutual authentication requires that the protocol participants check the validity of each other. In the proposed scheme, when a user U i sends the login message LM i to the server S, he or she in fact launches a challenge. That is, only the one that holds the master secret key a can correctly recover the value X i . As a result, if the response message AM s generated by the remote server S can pass through U i 's verification, then U i ensures that the remote server is the authorized one. Similarly, if the user U i can produce a correct response message AM i , then the remote server S can be sure that U i is a registered legitimate user. Thus, they authenticate each other and the proposed scheme achieves mutual authentication.
From the generation way of the session key, we can see that both a user U i and the remote server S contribute to the derivation of the session key , where X i is a random value produced by the user U i and Y s is a random value independently generated by the remote server S. This implies that neither the user U i nor the remote server S can control the value of the session key. Therefore, the proposed authentication scheme realizes the functionality of key agreement.
Perfect forward secrecy
Perfect forward secrecy ensures that the disclosure of a user's secret information (password and smart card) and the master secret key of the remote server S does not affect the security of those previously established session keys. In the proposed authentication scheme, the session key is calculated as SK = h(ID i jjID s jjX i jjY s jjK i, s ), where K i, s = T x (T y (u)). After either the user U i 's password and the smart card get exposed, or the master secret key a is revealed, an adversary A can recover the values X i and Y s . However, due to the intractability of the chaotic mapbased Diffie-Hellman problem, it is impossible for A to compute K i, s = T x (T y (u)). As a consequence, even if the master secret key gets exposed, the adversary cannot recover those previously used session keys, which implies that the proposed scheme features of perfect forward secrecy.
Three-factor authentication
The proposed authentication scheme provides the security guarantee of three-factor authentication. More precisely, in the login and authentication phase of the proposed scheme, a user U i is required to provide correct password PW i , actual biometrics B 0 i , and the corresponding smart card containing secret values. Now we show that if the user U i fails to provide one of the three authentication factors, then he or she cannot pass through the authentication of the server S.
First, if the password PW i is not correct, then the value r 0 i = W i È h(ID i jjPW i jjN i ) will not be equal to r i = h(ID i jja), which is directly computed by the remote server S. Second, if the smart card does not match inputted password PW i , then the user U i also cannot pass through the authentication due to the same reason. Moreover, if the imprinted biometrics B i 0 is not sampled from the same user U i , then it must be that M bio (H(B i ), H(B 0 i )).t, and the smart card will terminate the login process. Therefore, the proposed scheme achieves three-factor authentication and provides stronger security guarantee than two-factor authentication scheme.
Performance evaluation
In this section, we briefly evaluate the performance of the proposed authentication scheme by comparing it with several existing schemes in terms of computation cost and security properties.
As illustrated in Table 2 , early three-factor authentication schemes 18, 19 directly employ biometrics as an authentication factor and do not consider the security properties of session key agreement and perfect forward secrecy. Yeh et al. 22 used elliptic curve cryptography to achieve the functionalities of mutual authentication and perfect forward secrecy. However, Wu et al. 23 pointed out that this scheme fails to achieve the claimed security goals. In Cao and Ge's 21 scheme and Park et al.'s 24 scheme, the login and authentication procedure only involves cryptographic hash operations, and thus they cannot provide perfect forward secrecy. In addition, as discussed previously, Park et al.'s scheme suffers from offline password guessing attack and fails to achieve the security requirement of three-factor authentication scheme. In short, we can see that only our scheme can withstand various well-known attacks, without missing several desirable security functionalities, such as mutual authentication, key agreement, and perfect forward secrecy. Table 3 summarizes the computation cost of these listed schemes. As performed in Kocarev and Lian, 29 T h ' 0:5 ms, T e ' 63:08 ms, and T c ' T H ' 21:02 ms (on an Intel Pentium4 2600 MHz processor with 1 GB RAM). Since the registration procedure is performed in an offline manner, we only consider the computation overhead of the login and authentication process. In addition, the running time of XOR operation is rather low, and we thus ignore the timing results. We can see that previous schemes 18, 19, 21 are more efficient than other schemes since they do not use Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Compared with Park et al.'s 24 scheme, our scheme consumes more computation resources for providing stronger security guarantee, but we think the additional computation cost is acceptable and worthwhile. In addition, our scheme is more efficient than Yeh et al.'s 22 scheme. In conclusion, Tables 2 and 3 indicate that the proposed three-factor authentication scheme provides stronger and desirable security guarantees, at the cost of acceptable computation overhead. authentication scheme is absolutely essential for securing communications over the public channel. Three-factor remote user authentication schemes can provide stronger security guarantees than traditional authentication schemes and attract much attention in recent years. Although lots of such schemes have been proposed, most of them suffer from various attacks. In this article, we pointed out that Park et al.'s three-factor remote user authentication scheme is vulnerable to offline password guessing attack and also fails to provide several necessary security properties. Moreover, we put forward a security enhanced scheme to overcome these security flaws. By presenting security analysis and performance evaluation, we demonstrate that the proposed scheme is more suitable for practical applications.
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